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On Epistemic Consequentialism and the 
 Virtue Conflation Problem 
 
J. ADAM CARTER & IAN M. CHURCH 
  
Abstract. Addressing the ‘virtue conflation’ problem requires the 
preservation of intuitive distinctions between virtue types, i.e., between 
intellectual and moral virtues. According to one influential attempt to 
avoid this problem proposed by Julia Driver (2003), moral virtues 
produce benefits to others—in particular, they promote the well-being 
of others—while the intellectual virtues, as such, produce epistemic 
good for the agent. We show that Driver’s demarcation of intellectual 
virtue, by adverting to the self/other distinction, leads to a reductio, 
and ultimately, that the prospects for resolving the virtue conflation 
problem look dim within an epistemic consequentialist approach to the 
epistemic right and the epistemic good. 
 
0. Introduction 
According to David Hume, the project of demarcating distinguishing features of 
moral and intellectual virtues was of exaggerated importance1. At most, working 
out how “virtue” is used, was a project for grammarians2.  
 Nowadays, there’s less cause for being blasé here. With the advent of virtue 
epistemology in the 1990s as mainstream 3 , a working account of intellectual 
virtues, as such, is crucial to getting (for instance), contemporary virtue-theoretic 
analyses of knowledge (e.g., Greco (2010; 2012); Sosa (2009; 2011; 2015)) off the 
ground4.  
                                                
1 Hume (1975[1751], §262.) Cf., Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI. 
2 Driver (2003, 369), op. cit.  
3 See Axtell (2000, Introduction) and Greco & Turri (2011) for overviews. See also Brady & 
Prichard (2003) and DePaul & Zagzebski (2003) for representative work. 
4 Such a demarcation is important as well for the kind of virtue-theoretic project which Baehr 
(2011) calls autonomous virtue epistemology—viz., projects in epistemology which aim to illuminate 
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 According to Julia Driver (2003), if an account that discerns moral virtues 
from intellectual virtues is to be an adequate one, then it must pick out what is 
distinctively valuable about the traits in question (viz., the account must pick out 
the respective value-conferring properties of these virtue types). Put another way, 
an account must draw the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues in a 
principled way at the ‘level of value-conferring properties’ (2003, 367). Driver’s 
key contention is that the only account which can successfully satisfy this condition 
of adequacy is an account that distinguishes moral from intellectual virtues on the 
basis of what goods are produced by the respective virtues5, and so the only 
available account is a consequentialist account6. 
However, not just any consequentialist account will do. As Driver (2003) 
remarks:  
 
[…] [I]ntellectual virtues have—as their source of primary value—truth or, 
more weakly, justified belief for the person possessing the quality in question, and this 
is what ‘getting it right’ means for the intellectual virtues, whereas for the 
moral virtues the source of value is the benefit to others, the well-being of 
others, and for the moral virtues this is what ‘getting it right’ means. Further, 
no appeal to motive is needed to make the distinction at the level of value-
conferring property. It is not the motive that makes the trait a given type of 
virtue (2003, 374, our italics). 
 
Later in her paper, Driver clarifies her claim about the relationship between moral 
virtues and others, and intellectual virtues, and oneself. 
                                                
the nature of intellectual virtues independent of any theoretical role these virtues might play in the 
service of analyzing knowledge. 
5 The primary kind of rival account Driver has in mind are motivationalist accounts (e.g., Zagzebski 
1996), according to which ‘moral and intellectual virtue can only plausibly be distinguished in terms 
of the differing motivational structures characteristic of each’ (Driver 2003, 367). Driver’s objection 
is that such accounts fail to distinguish moral and intellectual virtues at the level of value-conferring 
property. Driver also critiques a related proposal by Montmarquet, though the details won’t 
concern us here, as the critical focus is Driver’s own proposal. 
6 See also Driver (2001). Cf., Jenkins (2007) for an example of an epistemic consequentialist account 
of epistemic rationality. More generally, for a seminal discussion of the distinction between 
instrumental and intrinsic epistemic merit, see Firth (1981). 
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“Moral virtues produce benefits to others—in particular, they promote the 
well-being of others—while the intellectual virtues produce epistemic good for 
the agent” (Ibid., 381). 
 
Driver’s proposal accordingly demarcates intellectual virtues along lines which are 
both (i) self-regarding rather than others-regarding; and (ii) consequentialist rather than 
motivationalist 7 . It is beyond our present scope to assess whether competing 
motivationalist accounts of intellectual virtue fail in the ways she suggests8.  
 Rather, we want to highlight what we think is an serious problem for the 
strategy-type which Driver has herself proposed, and then to show how the 
problem (and the intractability of the associated escape routes) reflects badly on 
the prospects of epistemic consequentialism, more generally, as an approach to 
epistemic rightness and goodness.9  
The problem for Driver’s strategy for distinguishing intellectual from moral 
virtues can be appreciated as a kind of trilemma10. Here is the plan: In §1, we 
show—by way of a short vignette—that the ‘self-regarding’ feature of Driver’s 
consequentialist solution to the problem leads to a reductio. In §2, we show (also 
                                                
7 Driver anticipates an obvious objection to this view, which is that moral virtues also produce 
benefits to oneself, and epistemic virtues can promote the well-being of others. Her response is that 
something can lead to valuable x, while its value-conferring property is nevertheless y (114). And 
so, it isn’t damaging to her position that some moral virtues benefit the agent, and some epistemic 
virtues benefit others. What would damage her view, though, is if some paragon moral virtue 
happens to not benefit others, or correlatively, if some paragon epistemic virtue failed to promote 
epistemic good for the agent. I think it’s safe to say that Driver is aware that such cases would be 
troublesome. This is evidenced in the final lines of her essay, when she writes: 
“But note that on the account I offer, if it turns out that [for example, in the moral case] 
honesty does not have the good effects we think it has, then it may well be that it is not a 
moral virtue. This seems highly unlikely, but it is possible. Some may find this result 
problematic for a consequentialist account. However, it should be noted that this problem 
occurs for any account that weighs consequences at all” (382). 
8 Motivationalist accounts, generally speaking, attempt to distinguish intellectual virtues on the 
basis of their characteristic aims, rather than in virtue of the epistemic goods they characteristically 
produce. This approach fits closely with virtue responsibilist accounts of the nature of epistemic 
virtues. See, for example, Montmarquet (1993), Fairweather (2001), Battaly (2015; forthcoming). 
9 While others have raised questions regarding Driver’s consequentialist strategy for demarcating 
intellectual and moral virtues—see, for example, Baehr (2012) and Battaly (2013)—focused 
critiques along these lines have not yet been developed.  
10 Thanks to an anonymous referee at Thought for suggesting that we state the problem this way. 
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by way of reductio) that an epistemic consequentialist strategy would fare no better 
than Driver’s preferred version vis-à-vis the virtue conflation problem if the view is 
to be cashed out as ‘others-regarding’ rather than ‘self-regarding’. In §3, the salient 
remaining consequentialist strategy type is canvassed, one which purports to 
demarcate intellectual and moral virtues without any kind of self/other proviso. 
This strategy, we argue, is also not equipped to resolve the virtue conflation 
problem either, and this is in part due to reasons Driver had herself already 
anticipated. Let’s now consider what Driver’s own view is committed to 
countenancing. 
 
1. The Truth Scrooge 
Veriticus T. Scrooge (also known as the ‘Truth Scrooge’) is the cousin of Ebenezer 
Scrooge. Ebenezer and Veriticus constantly argued. Whereas Ebenezer thought 
that money was power, and so he was a notorious miser with money, Veriticus 
thought Ebenezer was woefully shortsighted. Knowledge is power, so Veriticus was 
convinced, and he was a notorious miser with the truth. As the Truth Scrooge 
would tell himself: true beliefs are very valuable, and the more for him, the better. 
And so it happened that while Ebenezer acquired more money than anyone else 
in all of London, so Veriticus acquired in equal measure more true beliefs. 
 Each Christmas, the situation for the two cousins was unsurprisingly 
similar. Ebenezer was approached by hordes of folk who would beg him for his 
money, which he would exploitatively lend, never giving a scrap of his wealth to 
charity. And with knowledge that Veriticus was the richest in the city with truths, 
Londoners (eager to be better informed, so as to improve their lives) would 
approach Veriticus, begging for truths, which he was hardly prepared to give away 
for nothing11.  
 Veriticus, though he looked down on Ebenezer, admired his cousin’s 
shrewd lending policies and incorporated them into his own ‘truth-lending’ 
business. Just as Ebenezer would lend money at outlandish interest, so Veriticus 
                                                
11 Whenever asked to make a Christmas exception, Veriticus’s standard reply is that that’s a poor 
excuse for picking a man’s brain every 25th of December. 
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would give a single truth requested only if paid back threefold in epistemic value: 
one truth lent required repayment of three truths which Veriticus himself sought. 
Anyone unwilling to do the intellectual legwork necessary to repay the epistemic 
interest on the loan was welcome, he said, to boil in their own ignorance12.  
 While Veriticus, by his own doing, had no one with whom to share his 
massive stockpile of truths, he nonetheless took solace each Christmas eve in a 
moment of reflection: for he had succeeded in achieving what he regarded as his 
own best epistemic outcome, one that involves maximizing truth for himself whilst 
keeping others epistemically disadvantaged in a comparative truth-deficit13. The 
epistemic state of nature, was---as he often barked at those poor fools begging for 
his truths---a Hobbesian state of epistemic war. 
 The Truth Scrooge described in the foregoing is, in many ways, an 
epistemic abomination. But if epistemic traits qualify as epistemic virtues by way 
of producing epistemic goods for the agent, then a consequence is that the kind of 
intellectual character exhibited by the Truth Scrooge is beyond reproach. Even 
more, Driver’s account is compatible with the suggestion that the Truth Scrooge 
is a paragon of intellectual virtue.  
 The Truth Scrooge is however not an intellectual paragon, and this point 
needn’t rely on intuition that the Truth Scrooge is epistemically bad in all respects. 
(For, the Truth Scrooge does have some praiseworthy epistemic qualities14). For we 
can simply construct a comparison case. Imagine an agent just as effective at 
acquiring truth for himself as Veriticus—call this other individual Veriticus*—who 
                                                
12 “Are there no articles? Are there no books?” 
13 Assume, for the purposes of this example, that the true beliefs in question are also justified.  
14 Might it be that Veriticus is merely morally defective, but not epistemically defective? In short, we 
think not. We grant that Veriticus is in many ways morally criticisable. However, Veriticus’s 
intellectual stinginess remains an epistemically criticsable feature of Veriticus’s character (at least, 
it remains incompatible with his being an intellectual paragon) even if we shift the details of the 
case so that Veriticus’ moral stock is raised significantly (e.g., even if we were to suppose Veriticus 
used the information he hordes in the service of famine relief). Put another way, Veriticus remains 
criticisable from what William Alston (1985) calls an ‘epistemic point of view’; the point of view 
from which what matters is just epistemic goods. We can evaluate Veriticus from this point of view 
just as (for example) we can evaluate a house from multiple points of view: aesthetic, practical, etc. 
Thanks to a referee at Thought for requesting clarification on this point. 
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differs from Veriticus in that Veriticus* manifests what Roberts & Wood call 
epistemic generosity, a disposition to give intellectual goods ‘freely, gladly, and without 
calculation of repayment’ (Roberts & Wood 2007, 28715). The point can now be 
restated: to the extent that Veriticus* is more intellectually virtuous than Veriticus, 
it is implausible that, as Driver tells us, the intellectual virtues, as such, produce 
epistemic good for the agent. For if they did, there would be no way to account for 
why Veriticus*’s intellectual character is comparatively more praiseworthy. 
 Roberts & Wood (2007, 292-93) contrast epistemic generosity, as a virtue, 
with the corresponding vices of ‘intellectual stinginess’ and ‘intellectual greed’. 
They write:  
 
The intellectually stingy person reserves for himself what intellectual goods he 
has acquired, and is disinclined to share them with others. The intellectually 
greedy person has an inordinate concern to acquire the intellectual goods, in 
disregard for others’ acquisition of them (2007, 293). 
 
The primary example Roberts & Wood discuss when characterising the kind of 
deficit in intellectual character that is betrayed by the intellectually stingy involves 
the lead-up to the discovery of the double helix structure of DNA by James Watson 
and Francis Crick. Just prior to Watson & Crick’s famous discovery, they were 
anxious that Linus Pauling, working on the same project, might get his hands on 
X-Ray crystallographic photos of DNA (taken by Rosalind Franklin), photos which 
would aid Pauling’s research. Watson and Crick explicitly regarded Pauling as a 
‘threat’ and were ‘greatly relieved’ when they learned that Pauling’s own sketch of 
the double helix contained a mistake16.   
                                                
15 See Roberts & Wood (2007, Ch 11), which borrows from their earlier paper, ‘Generosity as an 
Intellectual Virtue’, The Cresset 67 (2003), 10–22. 
16 See Roberts & Wood (2007, 294-95). Cf., Strevens (2003), however, for a qualified defence of 
the epistemic value of science’s ‘priority rule’, which whereby the first to make a discovery is 
rewarded. We note that even if the priority rule has positive epistemic consequences in science, this 
is compatible with the internalistation of the rule, by individuals, to involve the manifesting of 
individual epistemic vices.  
  7 
 It should be relatively uncontroversial that Watson & Crick would have 
been more intellectually praiseworthy (i.e., they would not be Roberts’ and Wood’s 
first case of an exemplar of a form of epistemic vice) had they instead exhibited a 
greater level of epistemic generosity than they actually did in their intellectual 
pursuits, and an adequate account of intellectual virtue will need to have the 
resources to explain why this is so. And, even more, an adequate account must not 
rule more extreme instances of intellectual selfishness and greed—i.e., as in the 
case of the Truth Scrooge—as compatible with the intellectually virtuous paragon. 
 
2. From Scrooge to Mr. Fezziwig: self-regarding vs. others-regarding 
Given the ‘self-regarding’ nature of Driver’s consequentialist account of 
intellectual virtue—where intellectual virtue is aimed solely at acquiring the 
epistemic good (e.g., true belief) for the given agent—it seems to lack any resources 
for avoiding the conclusion that the Truth Scrooge is an unimpeachable paragon 
of intellectual virtue. Such a conclusion is (at best) counterintuitive. Accordingly, 
Driver’s consequentialist demarcation of intellectual virtues seems to be in trouble. 
But perhaps it would seem natural to embrace a modified version of Driver’s 
proposal, where, instead of being self-regarding, intellectual virtues are others 
regarding, though from within Driver’s wider consequentialist program.17  
 Such a modification could embrace the intuition that what Roberts and 
Wood call ‘intellectual greed’ and ‘intellectual stinginess’ are bona fide epistemic 
vices (just as more generally, stinginess and greed are moral vices), and as such 
allow Driver’s proposal to maintain a consequentialist framework while avoiding 
the kind of counterexample canvassed in §1. What is more, such a modification 
would distinguish moral and intellectual virtues with respect to the kinds of goods 
                                                
17 Of course, we might wonder if some paradigmatic examples of intellectual virtues can really be 
best understood in consequentialist terms of maximizing epistemic goods for others. It is difficult to 
see, for example, how intellectual virtues like open-mindedness and intellectual courage could be 
sufficiently others-regarding to still count as intellectual virtues on such a view. But given Driver’s 
willingness to disavow moral virtues that don’t fit into her framework of moral virtues promoting 
well-being in others (see Driver 2003, 382), perhaps a defender of this proposed modification could 
do the same thing for self-regarding intellectual virtues. Perhaps a defender of this modification could 
argue that self-regarding intellectual virtues like open-mindedness or intellectual courage are not 
really intellectual virtues after all.  
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they produce, but align moral and epistemic virtues along the dimension of whether 
they are self/others regarding.  
 Unfortunately, such a modification seems to also run into problems. To see 
how, let’s continue with our story. Ebenezer Scrooge can be easily contrasted with 
Mr. Fezziwig, Ebenezer’s former employer and mentor. When it comes to money, 
Mr. Fezziwig is the polar opposite of Ebenezer. Whereas Ebenezer is a terrible 
hoarder of money, Mr. Fezziwig is kind and generous. Whereas Ebenezer would 
never be parted with a single penny without guaranteeing outlandish interest, Mr. 
Fezziwig was quick to give freely and generously to those in need and was full of 
fiscal grace—arguably to a fault. But, in addition to being Ebenezer’s former 
employer and financial mentor, he was a part-time administrator at the local 
university, Truth Scrooge’s alma mater. Through his business and financial 
generosity, Mr. Fezziwig became a pillar of the community and a great connector 
of people and ideas. During the day Mr. Fezziwig worked with Ebenezer in Mr. 
Fezziwig’s business, but in the evenings and weekends he worked as the Associate 
Dean of Information Distribution at the local university to connect people to 
epistemic goods. And just as Ebenezer eventually became Mr. Fezziwig’s polar 
opposite when it comes to money, Truth Scrooge is Mr. Fezziwig’s polar opposite 
when it comes to epistemic goods. 
 Whereas Truth Scrooge is a notorious miser with the truth, Mr. Fezziwig 
lives to maximize the epistemic goods enjoyed by as many people as possible. 
Whereas Truth Scrooge would never share a single truth without guaranteeing 
outlandish epistemic interest, Mr. Fezziwig is quick to freely and generously 
connect anyone languishing in the poverty of ignorance to a wealth of epistemic 
goods. In fact, Mr. Fezziwig is focused on the epistemic well-being of others to such 
an extent that he neglects his own epistemic well-being. Just as Mr. Fezziwig’s 
generosity with money eventually costs him his own financial well-being—forcing 
him to sell his business—Mr. Fezziwig’s others-regarding concern for epistemic 
goods compromises his personal epistemic well-being.  
 Mr. Fezziwig personally enjoys few epistemic goods. He is so focused on 
fostering true belief, justification, and knowledge in others that he rarely takes any 
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time to process or otherwise maintain epistemic goods for himself 18 . And 
recognizing that if he were to spend time making sure that his own epistemic house 
was in order that the net total of epistemic goods enjoyed in the world might be 
diminished, Mr. Fezziwig is all too happy to play the epistemic martyr for the 
greater good. In the end, Mr. Fezziwig is epistemically impoverished. While the 
number of true and justified beliefs he was integral in fostered in others is legion, 
he himself enjoyed few justified beliefs and even fewer true beliefs. While as a 
university administrator he facilitated the development of discernment and critical 
thinking in a host of students—helping to create a generation of life-long 
learners—he never took the time to cultivate such skills in himself. In the end, Mr. 
Fezziwig’s epistemic life was governed by nasty bouts of ignorance, brutish 
gullibility, and intellectual short-sightedness.   
 When Driver’s consequentialist account of intellectual virtues is self-
regarding—where intellectual virtue is aimed solely at acquiring the epistemic 
good (e.g. true belief) for the agent who possesses them—it leads to the repugnant 
conclusion that Truth Scrooge is a paragon of intellectual virtue. Given that 
intellectual greed and stinginess are bona fide epistemic vices, Truth Scrooge seems 
profoundly intellectually vicious and not virtuous. But, as we’re now seeing, if we 
take this point on board and modify Driver’s consequentialist account of 
intellectual virtues to be others-regarding—where intellectual virtue is aimed at 
maximizing the epistemic goods enjoyed by as many people as possible—we end 
up with the conclusion that Mr. Fezziwig must be a paragon of intellectual virtue. 
But given Mr. Fezziwig’s ignorance, brutish gullibility, and intellectual short-
                                                
18 This is not to say that Mr. Fezziwig is intellectually bankrupt. As Kornblith (1993) has noted, 
some epistemic success is a precondition for any successful achieving of one's ends, including the 
end of skillfully facilitating the dissemination of information. We can stipulate that Fezziwig has 
intellectual competences which are very specific in the service of facilitating the dissemination of 
information. The crux of the defect, for Mr. Fezziwig, is that he does not cultivate is own intellectual 
life, beyond what is required to service the intellectual needs of others. Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for requesting clarification here. 
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sightedness, this is every bit as repugnant as the conclusion that Truth Scrooge is 
a paragon of intellectual virtue19.  
 
3. A Wider Problem for Epistemic Consequentialism? 
Perhaps the epistemic consequentialist could, at this juncture, strategically 
retreat 20 .  The self/other distinction, incorporated within an epistemic 
consequentialist approach to the virtue conflation problem, was, after all, partially 
(and, indeed, saliently) responsible for generating the reductios considered in §1 
and §2. One natural thought is that the consequentialist might fare better with a 
more flatfooted consequentialist approach, one which attempts to reconcile the 
virtue conflation problem by insisting that moral virtues, as such, promote well-
being and intellectual virtues, as such, produce epistemic goods. 
 This retreat however runs into two problems. Firstly, by Driver’s own 
recognition, the self/other distinction is needed for any plausible consequentialist 
solution to the virtue conflation problem because, as Driver puts it, the self/other 
distinction “helps to explain why honesty is a moral virtue rather than an 
intellectual virtue, though honesty is conducive to justified belief in other persons.” 
This appears to be an intractable problem for the consequentialist who responds 
                                                
19 Note that we grant that the Truth Scrooge can count as having some, perhaps many, intellectual 
virtues. What we deny is that he is a candidate for a paragon of intellectual virtue. Cf., fn. 16, for a 
similar discussion regarding Fezziwig. 
20 One reply we can envision on behalf of some versions of consequentialists (e.g., Pettigrew 2013; 
Levi 1967) is undercutting. The line would be that a virtue conflation problem arises in the first 
place only for consequentialist views which, like Driver’s own view, give the notion of an intellectual 
virtue a theoretically interesting role. In this respect, as this envisioned undercutting reply 
continues, it is theoretically uninteresting for at least some varieties of consequentialism, whether 
the conflation problem can be adequately resolved. To the extent that this line is right, then our 
argument might be claimed to have a rather limited scope. We have two central responses to this 
line. Firstly, it is important to note that it can be problematic for a philosophical thesis that it has, 
as a consequence, some result which is independently problematic. It is not the job of the 
consequentialist, per se, to tell us what an intellectual virtue is. But if, given consequentialism, it turns 
out that we cannot preserve intuitive distinctions about virtue types, then this is a prima facie 
problematic result for the standard consequentialist. Our second response is connected: a variant 
of worry can be resituated in non-virtue theoretic language. Consequentialists, more generally, are 
committed to regarding Veriticus as a closer approximation to the cognitive ideal than many 
individuals whom, intuitively, are to be evaluated more positively from an epistemic point of view. 
This variant on the objection faces standard consequentialists. Though, our central focus, to be 
clear, is consequentialist approaches to delineating the virtues. Thanks to an anonymous referee 
for suggesting clarification on this point.  
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to the reductios by abandoning the self/other distinction. But even if it could be 
overcome, it’s not obvious that doing so would effectively avoid the reductios. Let 
‘T’ be the total number of true beliefs acquired by Truth Scrooge, in light of his 
exercising a set of virtues V, and T-1 be the number of true beliefs acquired by 
‘Reformed’ Truth Scrooge, in light of exercising virtue a set of virtues V*. Say that 
‘Reformed’ Truth Scrooge is reformed in that he becomes (after a long night of 
tribulations) a more epistemically generous individual. Flatfooted epistemic 
consequentialism (i.e., Driver’s proposal, without the self/others distinction) rules 
Truth Scrooge as more epistemically virtuous, in light of V, than Reformed Truth 
Scrooge is in light of V*, given that (by a single truth) V has produced more true 
beliefs  (i.e., a single additional true belief) than V*. However, this result is 
counterintuitive; Reformed Truth Scrooge, replete with his newly acquired 
epistemic generosity, surely betrays an improvement in epistemic character. 
  Epistemic consequentialism, more generally, is a controversial thesis21. It’s 
beyond the present scope to suggest that the epistemic consequentialist’s difficulty 
with the virtue conflation problem as canvassed here is a pro tanto reason to 
embrace the rival characteristic motivation approach 22  to distinguishing between 
moral and intellectual virtues. However, to the extent that it the account purports 
to account for why a given trait is an intellectual, rather than a moral virtue, it 
looks as though consequentialism is in no position to claim any advantage23.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 See Ahlstrom-Vij & Dunn (2014) for a recent defence of this general position; Cf., Littlejohn 
(Forthcoming) for criticism. For an overview of recent work, see Dunn (2015). 
22 See for example, Montmarquet (1987; 1993), and Zagzebski (1996). Cf., Baehr (2011). 
23 Thanks to Emma C. Gordon for comments on a previous version of this paper. Thanks also to 
three anonymous referees at Thought. Adam Carter would also like to thank an audience at the 
University of Stirling for feedback on a very early ‘proto’ version of this paper in 2007. 
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